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Respondents Beaver Creek Coal Co. and CIGNA Insurance 
Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Beaver Creek") 
hereby file their Response to Petitioner's Petition for Review on 
appeal to this Court from the Industrial Commission. The 
Industrial Commission denied Petitioner's Motion for Review of 
the administrative law judge's Order denying Petitioner's claim 
for workers' compensation benefits. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the Petition for 
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 
35-1-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988) and 
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Beaver Creek submits that the issues on appeal and the 
standards of appellate review are as follows: 
(1) Whether Petitioner's work activities on April 15, 
1988 were the medical cause of his disability.1 
Petitioner argues that the issue is whether a compensable 
accident occurred. This misses the point, the Industrial 
Commission's decision turns upon the finding of no medical 
causation between the April 15, 1988 events and his disability. 
The Administrative Law Judge's order specifically does not reach 
the issue of legal causation, and that non-determination cannot 
be reviewed on appeal. Accordingly, a finding of a compensable 
accident cannot be made because the ALJ and the Commission did 
not make all the factual determinations necessary for an award of 
benefits. The ALJ and the Commission only made factual findings 
1 
The proper standard of review of this question is the 
"substantial evidence" test because medical causation is a 
factual issue. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 
63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). The administrative law judge ("ALJ") 
and the Industrial Commission (the "Commission") found that 
Petitioner's disability was not medically caused by his April 15, 
1988 work activities. (R. at 26). Petitioner claims, without 
support, that a "correction of error" standard should be used, 
but this Court has held that whether a disability is medically 
the result of a work-related activity is a question of fact. 
Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991). 
The proper standard of review for questions of fact is the 
"substantial evidence" test. Johnson v. Board of Review, 198 
Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 68 (Utah App. 1992). Findings of fact are 
affirmed if they are "supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Id., 
citing Stewart v, Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 
1992) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4)(g) (1989)). 
"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but 
necessary to support the finding of no medical causation and, as 
this was fatal to Petition's claim, no other findings were 
necessary. At most, the claim could be sent back for further 
proceedings, but that is not necessary in this case. 
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less than the weight of the evidence." Grace Drilling, P.2d 776 
at 68. 
(2) Whether the Industrial Commission applied the 
correct standard of proof to Petitioner's claim.2 
As this issue is a question of law, the standard of 
appellate review is "correction of error." Mor-Flo Industries v. 
Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah App. 1991). 
(3) Whether the Industrial Commission abused its 
discretion by failing to convene a Medical Panel. 
The standard of review of this issue is "abuse of 
discretion." The Supreme Court of Utah has stated that, in some 
cases, failure to convene a medical panel is an "abuse of 
discretion." Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 
703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985). This Court also applied an abuse 
of discretion standard when reviewing whether the ALJ should have 
referred the medical causation issue to a medical panel. Workers 
Comp Fund v. Industrial Commission, 761 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah App. 
1988). 
Petitioner argues that the issue is what standard the ALJ 
applied, but it is the Commission's order which is being 
reviewed, and that is the only relevant inquiry. 
3 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following statutes and Rule are determinative in 
this appeal: 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-77 (1988), Utah Code 
Annotated Section 63-46(b)-16(4)(g) (1988) and Utah 
Administrative Code R490-1-9. The determinative statutes and 
rules are fully set forth in Exhibit A of the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner seeks review of the Commission's Order 
denying his Motion for Review of the ALJ's denial of workers' 
compensation benefits. The ALJ denied workers' compensation 
benefits on the grounds that Plaintiff's work activities were 
not the medical cause of his disability. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Petitioner applied for permanent total disability 
compensation benefits claiming that he suffered an industrial 
accident on April 15, 1988 which caused or contributed to his 
disability from degenerative osteoarthritis (R. 8). Beaver Creek 
submits that Petitioner's disability was not caused by an 
industrial accident, but was solely due to a preexisting 
condition and, therefore, that Petitioner is not entitled to 
permanent total disability benefits. 
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A hearing before an ALJ was held on February 26, 1991. 
(R. at 19). The ALJ found that Petitioner's back condition was 
not caused by his work activity but was the result of 
degenerative osteoarthritis and disc disease. (R. 26). The ALJ 
dismissed Petitioner's claim with prejudice and Petitioner filed 
a Motion for Review with the Commission. On February 18, 1992, 
the Commission denied Petitioner's Motion for Review, finding 
that Petitioner's medical problems were preexisting, that no 
credible medical evidence conflicted with that determination, and 
that the ALJ did not err. (R. 107). 
Statement of Facts 
Petitioner's medical records show a history of back 
problems beginning in 1970. In 1970 Petitioner was injured while 
working for a coal company in Colorado when he stooped to pick up 
a cable and was unable to straighten up. (R. 20). Petitioner 
experienced right leg pain following this incident and, in August 
of 1971, he underwent back surgery, a lumbar laminectomy, which, 
according to Petitioner, eliminated the right leg pain. (R. 20). 
According to his medical records, Petitioner next 
sought medical attention for back problems on July 8, 1983. On 
that day, Petitioner went to Emery Medical Center complaining of 
back pain, bilateral shoulder pain and left hip pain. (R. A-7 at 
73). The attending physician took X-rays and diagnosed 
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Petitioner with severe osteoarthritis and degenerative disc 
disease of the lumbar spine. (R. A-7 at 73). 
Petitioner was next treated for back problems on 
January 16, 1988. On that day, Petitioner was at home hanging a 
ceiling fan when the ladder on which he was standing collapsed 
and he fell. (R. 20). Petitioner went to see Dr. Faust and was 
diagnosed with thoraco-cervical strain/sprain; grade II 9 
intervertebral disc syndrome C-5, C-6 with brachial extension 
neuralgia of the right shoulder and arm as a direct complication. 
(R. A-8 at 169). Petitioner was treated by Dr. Faust eight times 
in January 1988, seven times in February 1988, and four times in 
March 1988. (R. 20). Petitioner testified that Dr. Faust 
treated only his shoulders and neck. (R. 20). 
Petitioner claims his next bout with back pain occurred 
at work for Beaver Creek Coal Co. on April 15, 1988. Petitioner 
testified at the hearing before the ALJ that he experienced back 
pain as a result of jerking a 20-25 pound wire mesh screen off a 
stack, but there is no mention in the record of any such screen 
jerking incident until the 1991 hearing before the ALJ. The ALJ 
found that the screen jerking testimony was not credible. Dr. 
Konrad P. Kotrady, M.D. treated Petitioner on the day of the 
industrial incident but Dr. Kotrady's records say nothing of the 
alleged screen jerking. (R. A-2 at 9). Dr. Kotrady's records 
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instead state that Petitioner was walking and climbing up and 
down the belt drive when he experienced pain. (R. A-2 at 9) . 
Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner also treated Petitioner after 
the April 15, 1988 incident, but their records say nothing about 
screen jerking. Dr. Heiner's records say that Petitioner 
experienced right hip pain on April 15, 1988 while re-guarding a 
belt drive which required Petitioner to climb, reach and stretch. 
(R. A-6 at 63). Petitioner experienced back pain on April 23, 
1988 and was admitted to Castleview Hospital. The Castleview 
records state that Petitioner was climbing up and down a drive 
taking long steps when there "was a twisting type motion which 
grabbed at his back, leg and right hip," but say nothing about 
screen jerking. (R. A-4 at 22). Finally, there is not even any 
mention of the alleged screen jerking incident in the form which 
Petitioner completed for his attorney in August of 1988 or in his 
application for hearing. (R. 8, 25). 
The ALJ dismissed Petitioner's testimony regarding the 
screen jerking and found by a preponderance of the evidence that 
on April 15, 1988, Petitioner experienced hip pain while 
re-guarding the belt drive with 20-25 pound wire mesh guards 
which involved climbing, stretching, reaching and possibly 
twisting. (R. 25, 107). 
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After leaving work on April 15, 1988, Petitioner went 
to Emery Medical Center and was treated by Dr. Kotrady. Dr. 
Kotrady diagnosed Petitioner with right hip pain, severe 
degenerative arthritis in the hips, pelvic and lumbar spine, 
degenerative disc disease in all levels of the lumbar spine and 
scoliosis. (R. A-2 at 9-10) . Dr. Kotrady completed a 
Physician's Initial Report in which he marked both the "yes" and 
the "no" box in answer to the question, "Is condition requiring 
treatment the result of the industrial injury or exposure 
described?" (R. A-2 at 12). In the Remarks section of the 
Physician's Initial Report, Dr. Kotrady wrote, "Degenerative 
arthritis and disc disease pre-existing the injury. X-ray 
evidence in 1983." (R. A-2 at 12). Dr. Kotrady's follow-up 
notes state that Petitioner had full range of motion in his back 
and that his assessment was ligamentitus strain of the right hip, 
but no back involvement. (R. A-2 at 8). 
Petitioner was later seen by Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner. 
Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner each completed a one-page, fill-in-the-
blank "Summary of Medical Record Form" which had been provided by 
Petitioner's attorney. (R. A-5 at 46, A-6 at 60). The doctors 
completed the fill-in-the-blank form in September of 1988 and 
there is no evidence in the record that Petitioner has been rated 
since that time. Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner each gave a 
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disability rating for Petitioner, without explanation or 
reference to the AMA Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment, and each attributed half of the rating to the 
April 15, 1988 incident. However, neither of them had access to 
Petitioner's prior medical records when they rated him. (R. 24). 
Dr. Gaufin's and Dr. Heiner's Summary of Medical Record Forms are 
attached hereto as Exhibits B and C. 
Despite his rating that one-half of Petitioner's 
disability was due to the April 15th incident, Dr. Heiner 
diagnosed Petitioner with severe degenerative arthritis of the 
lumbosacral spine. (R. A-5 at 50). Dr. Heiner's September 26, 
1989 notes indicate that Petitioner's condition is unpredictable 
because severe pain bouts can occur just from walking, sitting or 
standing, but pain most often occurs when Petitioner twists or 
turns. (R. A-5 at 51). Dr. Heiner's medical notes also reveal 
that Petitioner experienced severe back pain on July 7, 1988 
while washing two cars (R. A-5 at 61) and on April 21, 1989 when 
he fell while attempting to hang Christmas lights. (R. A-5 at 
52). 
Dr. Gaufin saw Petitioner on May 5, 1988, and his 
impression of Petitioner was acute lumbar radiculopathy L4-5, 
L3-4, right, secondary to degenerative disc and joint disease 
with disc protrusion at L3-4, L4-5, right greater than left, and 
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chronic osteoarthritis and degenerative disc disease and joint 
disease, Ll-2, L2-3, L3-4, L4-5, L5-S1 bilaterally. (R. A-6 at 
66). Dr. Gaufin's December 21, 1988 impression of Petitioner is 
acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy secondary to degenerative 
disc and joint disease. (R. A-6 at 58.) Finally, Dr. Gaufin 
comments in a December 21, 1988 letter that Petitioner has a 
permanent disability, and will be unable to work in the future 
because of a severe degenerative process of the lumbar spine. 
(R. A-6 at 58.) Dr. Gaufin also comments in that letter that his 
goal is to reduce the rate at which the joints in Petitioner's 
lower back wear out and, hopefully, minimize severe crippling 
effects which might occur. (R. A-6 at 59). 
After reviewing the medical records and conducting a 
hearing, the ALJ determined that Petitioner's disability was due 
to a preexisting condition and that Petitioner did not prove that 
any incident on April 15, 1988 caused his disability. (R. 26). 
The ALJ noted that Dr. Kotrady was of the opinion that 
Petitioner's back problems were preexisting. (R. 25). Dr. 
Kotrady's explanation of the hip pain was arthritis of the hip 
joints, confirmed by X-ray, which he believed was caused by 
Petitioner shifting weight from his bad back to his hip. 
(R. 25). The ALJ also noted that Dr. Kotrady was unable to give 
a definitive yes to whether the industrial injury caused 
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Petitioner's pain. (R. 25). The ALJ emphasized that Dr. Kotrady 
diagnosed Petitioner with degenerative disc disease and 
degenerative arthritis found in both the 1988 X-ray and the 1983 
X-ray. (R. 25). The ALJ noted that Dr. Kotrady found no acute 
changes in Petitioner's condition from 1983 to 1988. (R. 25). 
In addition to Dr. Kotrady's diagnosis, the ALJ noted that the 
Castleview Hospital records refer to extensive degenerative 
arthritis in the lumbar spine and show no acute herniations or 
fractures in the X-ray and no changes from the 1983 X-ray. 
(R. 26). 
The ALJ found Dr. Gaufin's medical records 
contradictory because he diagnosed extensive degenerative 
arthritic changes yet he indicated that one-half of Petitioner's 
impairment was due to the April 15, 1988 incident. (R. 26). The 
ALJ noted that Dr. Gaufin did not have access to Petitioner's 
prior medical records and that Dr. Gaufin found that Petitioner 
was unable to work because of a severe degenerative process of 
the lumbar spine. (R. 26). The ALJ also pointed out that Dr. 
Heiner also did not have access to Petitioner's prior medical 
records and that neither Dr. Heiner nor Dr. Gaufin explained how 
they arrived at their impairment ratings. Finally, the ALJ 
questioned the basis of Dr. Gaufin's and Dr. Heiner's impairment 
ratings. The only evidence of these ratings were brief notations 
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on fill-in-the-blank forms which were prepared by Petitioner's 
counsel. (R. 26) . The Commission held that, since the doctors' 
conclusions were based on incomplete information, they could be 
discounted and did not constitute credible medical evidence. 
(R. 73). 
The ALJ concluded that there was "no confirmation of 
contribution from the work activities of April 15, 1988," and 
that Petitioner's need for treatment and any disability after 
April 15, 1988, were the result of his long-standing, preexisting 
degenerative back condition. (R. 25, 26). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner seeks permanent total disability benefits 
for osteoarthritis in his back, based upon a claimed event which 
he has been unable to consistently describe. He has 
long-standing back problems and was diagnosed with severe 
degenerative osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine and degenerative 
disc disease five years before this alleged accident. 
Petitioner's condition is not compensable because it was not 
caused by his activities at work. The ALJ and the Commission 
found that Petitioner's disability was due to his pre-existing 
condition, severe degenerative osteoarthritis, and that his work 
activities on April 15, 1988 were not the medical cause of his 
disability. When reviewing a factual finding of medical 
12 
causation the proper standard of review is whether substantial 
evidence supports the finding. The ALJ and the Commission's 
finding of no medical causation is supported by substantial 
evidence, based on the testimony given at the hearing and a 
review of the medical records. 
In order to have a factual finding overturned on 
appeal, the Petitioner must marshal the evidence and show that 
the Commission's findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence. In this case, Petitioner has not marshaled the 
evidence supporting the findings of the Commission and the ALJ, 
nor has he shown that there is not substantial evidence 
supporting the determinations. Therefore, this Court must defer 
to the unchallenged factual findings of the ALJ and the 
Commission. 
The Commission applied the correct standard of proof to 
the findings of fact. Petitioner argues that the ALJ held that 
Petitioner's work activities must "significantly" contribute to 
his pre-existing conditions in order for the condition to be 
compensable. Petitioner's argument is irrelevant because it is 
the Commission's order and not the ALJ's order which is on review 
to this Court and Petitioner does not claim that the Commission 
applied the wrong standard of proof. In addition, Petitioner's 
argument is wrong because, as the Commission found, the ALJ used 
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the proper standard. She found that Petitioner's disability was 
due to a pre-existing condition and that there was no 
confirmation of contributions from his April 15, 1988 work 
activities. 
Petitioner argues that the ALJ abused her discretion by 
not referring this matter to a medical panel. Referral to a 
medical panel, however, is not mandatory but is in the discretion 
of the ALJ and the Commission. In this case, the ALJ and the 
Commission examined the evidence and determined that there was no 
credible evidence of medical causation and, therefore, no reason 
to refer the matter to a medical panel. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS BECAUSE HIS DISABILITY IS THE RESULT OF SEVERE 
DEGENERATIVE OSTEOARTHRITIS AND WAS NOT CAUSED BY HIS WORK 
ACTIVITIES. 
A. The Petition Should be Dismissed Because Petitioner has 
Failed to Marshal the Evidence and Refute the Factual 
Finding of no Medical Causation. 
Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence that his disability was caused by an industrial 
accident. Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954, 956. 
(Utah App. 1988) .3 In order to receive workers7 compensation 
Petitioner tries to circumvent his burden of proof by 
arguing that the Workers Compensation Act should be liberally 
construed. Liberal construction does not, however,, relieve 
Petitioner from the requirement of proving all elements of his 
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benefits, Petitioner must prove that an industrial accident was 
the medical cause of his disability. "The medical causation 
requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general 
insurer of his employees and discourage fraudulent claims." 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 26-27 (Utah App. 
1986). In this case, Petitioner failed to prove medical 
causation. (R. 26). The ALJ and the Commission found that 
Petitioner's back condition was due to degenerative 
osteoarthritis and degenerative disc disease with no proof of 
contribution from the April 15, 1988 industrial incident. 
(R. 26, 77). 
In order to overturn the findings of the Commission, 
Petitioner must first marshal the evidence supporting the 
Commission's finding and then show that the finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence. Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 
68. In Grace Drilling, this Court explained the application of 
the substantial evidence test for reviewing findings of fact: 
claim by a preponderance of the evidence, including medical 
causation. If he fails to meet his burden of proof his claim 
must be denied. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 
709 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court of Utah stated 
"[w]hile disability claims are liberally construed in favor of 
awarding benefits . . . we do not overturn the Commission's 
findings unless they are arbitrary or capricious, wholly without 
cause, contrary to the one inevitable conclusion from the 
evidence or without substantial evidence to support them." 
Petitioner's argument at p.11 of his brief that he is entitled to 
have all factual doubts resolved in his favor is flatly wrong. 
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[i]t is also important to note that the 
'whole record test' necessarily requires that 
a party challenging the Board's findings of 
fact must marshal[] all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite 
the supporting facts, and in light of the 
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence. Id. 
This Court also stated in Grace Drilling that: "[i]n undertaking 
such a review, this court will not substitute its judgment as 
between two reasonable conflicting views, even though we may have 
come to a different conclusion had the case come before us for de 
novo review." Id. , and: " [i]t is the province of the Board, not 
appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it 
is for the Board to draw the inferences." Id., citing Board of 
Educ. of Montgomery County v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 491 A.2d 1186, 
1193 (1985). 
Petitioner has failed to even attempt to marshal the 
evidence in this case and, therefore, has not and cannot 
challenge the Commission's finding of no medical causation. 
Instead of marshaling the evidence, Petitioner merely makes 
general statements in his Brief such as: "The evidence that 
petitioner suffered an industrial injury...is overwhelming," and 
"both of the examining doctors assign one-half of the 
petitioner's injuries to the industrial accident." These general 
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statements do nothing to show the facts supporting the 
Commission's decision, and do not amount to marshaling the 
evidence. In Johnson v. Board of Review, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
68, this Court found that a party who challenges the Commission's 
findings of fact must marshal all the evidence in support of 
those findings and show that those findings are not supported by 
substantial .evidence. 
Petitioner does not show that the Commission's findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner does not 
address Dr. Kotrady's findings nor does he address the ALJ's 
findings regarding Drs. Gaufin and Heiner. Dr. Gaufin and Dr. 
Heiner both diagnosed degenerative osteoarthritis, yet neither 
doctor explained how the April 15, 1988 incidents contributed to 
or caused Petitioner's degenerative condition. Additionally, 
Petitioner provides no credible medical evidence explaining how 
the hip pain he suffered in April 15, 1988 aggravated his 
degenerative back disease. Finally, Petitioner does not explain 
the conflicting reports of what actually occurred on April 15, 
1988 and does not explain why there is no mention of the screen 
jerking incident in the record until the hearing. 
Petitioner claims that he was unable to marshal the 
evidence because the ALJ's findings of fact were "grossly 
inadequate." The ALJ's findings of fact, however, are clearly in 
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line with the recent case of Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 
(Utah App. 1991)• Adams requires findings by the ALJ which 
"indicate respectively (1) the issues decided, .... (2) the legal 
interpretation and applications made...and (3) the subsidiary 
factual findings in support of the decision.... Xd. at 6. 
In this case, (1) the ALJ found that Petitioner did not 
injure his back on April 15, 1988 at work and that Petitioner's 
April 15, 1988 work activities did not cause Petitioner's 
disability. (2) The ALJ applied the law that compensation will 
be awarded only when the industrial incident is the medical cause 
of the disability for which compensation is sought. (3) She 
supported her decision by reviewing the descriptions of the 
April 15, 1988 events in the record, by referring to the 
substance of all the doctors' medical records, and by resolving 
the factual discrepancies in the testimony and the medical 
records. She found, based in part on 1983 x-rays, that 
Petitioner had a severe degenerative condition which preexisted 
April 15, 1988. (R. 26.) She pointed to specifics in Dr. 
Kotrady's medical records and in Dr. Gaufin's and Dr. Heiner's 
medical records.4 (R. 25, 26). She found that Dr., Kotrady was 
Petitioner argues that the ALJ casually disregarded 
Dr. Gaufin's and Dr. Heiner's ratings. On the contrary, the ALJ 
found that the fill-in-the-blanks forms were not reliable because 
the doctors did not explain the basis for the ratings and did not 
have access to Petitioner's prior medical records. Moreover, she 
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clearly of the opinion that the Petitioner's problems were 
preexisting and that he was unable to answer a definitive "yes" 
to whether the industrial injury caused the symptoms. (R. 25). 
In addition, she found that there were no acute changes in 
Petitioner's x-rays from 1983-1988 and that Dr. Gaufin, Dr. 
Heiner and Dr. Kotrady all found that Petitioner had a severe 
degenerative back condition. (R. 25, 26.) 
In addition to the ALJ's findings, the Commission's 
findings were also quite specific. The Commission emphasized 
that the treating physician on April 15, 1988 (Dr. Kotrady) "was 
clearly of the opinion that the applicant's medical problems were 
preexisting." (R. 106.) The Commission noted that the 
Castleview records refer to severe degenerative osteoarthritis 
and that the x-ray readings in 1983 and 1988 were "remarkably 
similar." (R. 106.) The Commission also noted that Dr. Gaufin 
and Dr. Heiner's fill-in-the-blank forms could be discounted 
because the doctors did not have access to Petitioner's prior 
medical records when they completed them. (R. 107.) The ALJ's 
Order and the Commission's Order each set out and explain 
specific facts and how those facts lead to the conclusion that 
stated that Dr. Gaufin's rating seemed to contradict his 
diagnosis. (R. 26). 
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Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving medical 
causation. 
B. The Aggravation of a Preexisting Condition is 
Compensable Only if it is a Permanent, Ratable 
Aggravation. 
Despite his failure to marshal the evidence, and 
despite that the Commission found no evidence of aggravation, 
Petitioner argues that his work activities on April 15, 1988 
aggravated his preexisting condition and, therefore, that his 
injury is compensable. Petitioner cites Powers v. Industrial 
Commission, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (Utah 1967), for the proposition 
that "the aggravation or lighting up of a preexisting disease by 
an industrial accident is compensable. . . . " Petitioner's 
argument that "any aggravation" is compensable is unfounded. 
In Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah 
App. 1990), this Court held that an aggravation of a preexisting 
condition is not compensable if it is a temporary aggravation or 
a non-ratable acceleration of symptoms. Xd. Only a permanent, 
ratable aggravation of a preexisting condition is compensable. 
Id. 
In Virgin, the petitioner was injured at work when a 
support chain broke and an automobile engine hit him in the left 
hip and knocked him down. lei. at 1285. The petitioner sought 
review of the Commission's Order denying workers' compensation 
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benefits. The Commission concluded that there was no causal 
connection between petitioner's injury and the hip replacement 
surgery for which he sought compensation. Id. About fourteen 
months after the accident, petitioner went to see an orthopedic 
surgeon who concluded that petitioner had aseptic necrosis of the 
left hip and, to a lesser degree, of the right hip. The 
orthopedic surgeon concluded that this was probably caused by 
alcoholism and recommended a hip replacement. Id. 
Petitioner sought workers' compensation benefits for 
the hip replacement claiming that his hip condition was 
aggravated by the industrial accident. The ALJ appointed a 
medical panel of one orthopedic surgeon who concluded "I think 
perhaps it happened sooner than it would have had he not had an 
injury, but I feel he would have ultimately needed surgery on 
this in spite of any industrial injury. . . . " Id. at 1286. The 
ALJ found that the industrial accident permanently aggravated 
petitioner's preexisting condition and thus was causally 
connected to his hip replacement. The Commission reviewed the 
case and overturned the ALJ's order and findings. Id. 
On review to this Court, the petitioner argued that 
because the Medical Panel found that the industrial accident 
aggravated his preexisting condition, his hip replacement was 
compensable. Id. at 1287. This Court held that petitioner's 
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injury was not ci ratable permanent aggravation of his preexisting 
condition and, therefore, was not compensable. Id. at 1289. 
As with Virgin, this case involves the alleged 
aggravation of a preexisting condition. There is no credible 
medical evidence that Petitioner's condition was permanently 
aggravated by his April 15 work activities. Indeed, substantial 
evidence shows, instead, that Petitioner's disability is due to 
severe degenerative arthritis and degenerative disc disease.5 
This case is also analogous to Giesbrecht v. Board of 
Review, 828 P.2d 544 (Utah App. 1992). In Giesbrecht, this Court 
addressed the "direction of medical causality" and held that in 
order to be compensable, the injury at work must aggravate the 
preexisting condition. Id. at 547. In Giesbrecht, the applicant 
fractured his femur at work. He discovered cancer in the bone 
and sought worker's compensation. .Id. at 545-546. This Court 
found that while the cancer may have aggravated the femur 
Petitioner briefly states that the Commission should have 
looked at Petitioner's entire employment history with Beaver 
Creek Coal Co. in determining whether he suffered a compensable 
injury. It is unclear what Petitioner is trying to argue. 
Petitioner cites cases which deal with legal causation, which is 
not at issue in this appeal. Any inference that the effects of a 
life-time of living and working is automatically compensable as 
an industrial accident is wholly unsupported and goes against the 
purpose and intent of workers' compensation laws. Finally, 
Petitioner made a claim only for an alleged industrial accident 
on April 15, 1988. To now claim in alternative that perhaps his 
problems were caused by repetitive motion is not .supported in the 
record and was not properly raised below. 
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fracture, in order to recover, the applicant had to prove the 
reverse: "that the femur fracture contributed to, accelerated, 
or aggravated the cancer." Id. Since there was no evidence it 
did, denial of compensation was affirmed. (R. A-2 at 9.) 
In this case, Dr. Kotrady stated that Petitioner's hip 
pain was possibly caused by compensating for his back problem by 
shifting his weight to his hips. However, there is certainly 
nothing to support that Petitioner's hip problem contributed to 
or aggravated his back problem, and therefore, his disability is 
not compensable. 
II. THE COMMISSION AND THE ALJ APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF 
PROOF TO PETITIONER'S CLAIM. 
A. It is the Commission's Order which is on Review and The 
Commission Applied the Correct Standard of Proof to 
Petitioner's Claim. 
Petitioner argues that the ALJ applied the incorrect 
standard of proof because, in her Order, she stated that 
Petitioner's symptoms "were not the result of any significant 
contribution by the activities of April 15, 1988." Petitioner 
construes this to mean that the ALJ found that work activities 
must significantly contribute to a preexisting condition in order 
to be compensable. However, Petitioner ignores other language in 
the ALJ's Order and the analysis made by the Commission in its 
Order. 
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The Commission applied the correct standard and it is the 
Commission's Order which is being reviewed by this Court. In 
Ring v. Industrial Commission, 744 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah App. 
1987), this Court stated that a decision by the Commission "which 
finally disposes of a proper motion for review is a final order 
subject to review only by timely appeal to the Court of Appeals." 
As it is the Commission's order which is being reviewed, whether 
the ALJ applied the wrong standard is irrelevant as long as the 
Commission did not apply the wrong standard. In its Order the 
Commission stated that the ALJ "did not use the standard alleged" 
by Petitioner. (R. 107). The Commission found that the ALJ did 
not apply a significant contribution standard and, therefore, it 
follows that the Commission did not apply a significant 
contribution standard in affirming the ALJ's order. 
B. The ALJ Applied the Correct Standard of Proof to 
Petitioner's Claim. 
The ALJ did use the language "significant contribution" 
but, it is apparent from the Orders of both the ALJ and the 
Commission that the ALJ did not apply that standard. As noted 
above, the Commission found that the ALJ did not apply a 
"significant contribution" standard regarding aggravation of a 
preexisting injury: 
. . . it appears that the ALJ determined that 
the applicant's treatment on April 15, 1988 
had nothing to do with his work, and resulted 
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entirely from his pre-existing condition with 
no contribution from his work place labor. 
(R. 107). The ALJ specifically stated that Petitioner's 
preexisting condition was the cause of his need for treatment 
with "no confirmation of contribution from the work activities of 
April 15, 1988." (R. 25). The ALJ found that there was no 
contribution from the April 15 work events and did not need to 
address the question of what degree of aggravation was 
compensable since there was no aggravation.5 
III. THE COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL BECAUSE IT WAS 
ABLE TO MAKE THE DETERMINATION REGARDING MEDICAL CAUSATION 
ON THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT. 
A. The Commission did not need to Refer this Matter to a 
Medical Panel Because there was no Credible Evidence of 
Medical Causation. 
Failure to refer to a medical panel cannot be an abuse 
of discretion when there is no credible evidence of medical 
causation. Plaintiff would have the Commission convene a medical 
panel so he can try to prove his case at state expense, but 
medical panels should not be used to fill in the gaps in 
Petitioner also argues that the ALJ applied a "clear and 
convincing" standard rather than a preponderance of the evidence 
standard to the issue of causation, but the ALJ specifically used 
the term "preponderance of medical evidence." (R. 26). She used 
the term "clearly" in dicta only when referring to legal 
causation not medical causation. She was not applying a clear 
and convincing standard but merely saying that if she had reached 
the issue of legal causation it is not "clear" that Petitioner's 
work activities could be classified as "unusual exertion." The 
ALJ did not reach the issue of legal causation because the 
finding of no medical causation is dispositive. 
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Petitioner's case. In Workers' Comp. Fund v. Industrial 
Commission, 761 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah App. 1988), this Court stated 
in response to an argument that failure to refer to a medical 
panel was an abuse of discretion, "we cannot say that the 
administrative law judge abused his discretion in not referring 
this case to a medical panel when there was medical evidence to 
support his finding of medical causation." It follows that there 
is no requirement to refer to a medical panel when there is 
evidence of no causation and certainly when there is no credible 
evidence of medical causation. 
There is ample medical evidence to support the ALJ's 
finding of no medical causation. Petitioner presented only two 
fill-in-the-blank forms from doctors who did not have access to 
his prior medical records. (R. 26, 107.) The doctors did not 
review Petitioner's 1983 X-rays and therefore did not see that 
there were no acute changes from the 1983 X-rays to the 1988 
X-rays. The doctors rated Petitioner in September, 1988, and 
stated, without explanation, that 50% of the impairment was due 
to the accident only a few months before. There is no indication 
that the ratings were based on the AMA guidelines. (R. 46, 60). 
The ALJ relied on Dr. Kotrady's medical records which state that 
Petitioner's condition was caused by his preexisting, severe 
degenerative osteoarthritis of the back and degenerative 
arthritis of both hips. (R. A-2 at 9). Dr. Kotrady first saw 
26 
Petitioner on April 15, 1988, and diagnosed Petitioner with the 
benefit of Petitionees prior medical records. 
B. Referral to a Medical Panel is Discretionary. 
Petitioner puts much emphasis on the fact that Dr. 
Gaufin's and Dr. Heiner's impairment ratings differed by more 
than 5% and argues that R490-1-9 of the Utah Administrative Code 
mandates reference to a medical panel in this situation. This 
argument puts the cart before the horse because the ALJ and the 
Commission found no credible evidence of medical causation and, 
therefore, any conflict over impairment ratings is irrelevant. 
Permanent partial disability ratings are not at issue in this 
case because the Commission found no credible evidence of medical 
causation and, therefore, no medical dispute. 
Reference to a medical panel is, in any event, 
discretionary. Utah Code Ann. 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988) states: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation 
for injury by accident, or for death, arising 
out of and in the course of employment, and 
if the employer or its insurance carrier 
denies liability, the commission may refer 
the medical aspects of the case to a medical 
panel appointed by the commission. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The above statute makes referral to a medical panel 
discretionary; the Commission may appoint a medical panel but is 
not required to do so. In Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008, 
1012 (Utah 198 6), the Utah Supreme Court stated "reference to the 
medical panel is controlled by statute. In 1982, the legislature 
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amended U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-77 and changed the requirement of 
mandatory referral to the medical panel to permissive referral." 
Id. 
Despite the above statute and case law, Petitioner 
argues that R490-1-9 mandates referral to a medical panel. 
Regulation 490-1-9, however, simply sets out guidelines and 
cannot be construed as mandatory for a number of reasons. The 
first reason that R490-1-9 cannot be construed as mandatory is 
that the legislature intended referral to a medical panel to be 
discretionary. The legislature specifically changed reference to 
a medical panel from mandatory to discretionary. Before it was 
amended, U.C.A. 35-1-77 (1953) said: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation 
for injury or by accident or for death 
arising out of or in the course of employment 
and where the employer or insurance carrier 
denies liability, the commission shall refer 
the medical aspects of the case to a medical 
panel appointed by the commission. . . .. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In 1982, the legislature amended U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-77 and 
changed the shall refer to a medical panel to may refer to a 
medical panel. Hone, 778 P.2d at 1012. R490-1-9 cannot be read 
to circumvent legislative intent. 
The second reason that the Regulation cannot be 
construed as mandatory is that, if it were mandatory, it would be 
void as beyond the scope of U.C.A. § 35-1-77 (1988). The word 
"may11 in § 35-1-77 indicates that it is discretionary and, 
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therefore, it cannot be made mandatory by a regulation. In 
Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 
App. 1988) this Court stated: 
An administrative agency's authority to 
promulgate regulations is limited to those 
regulations which are consonant with the 
statutory framework, and neither contrary to 
the statute or beyond its scope. 
Any regulation which makes referral to a medical panel mandatory 
is not consistent with and goes beyond the scope of U.C.A. 
§ 35-1-77 and is therefore void. 
The final reason that R490-1-9 cannot be construed as 
mandatory is that the ALJ can disregard the finding of the 
medical panel in light of other evidence. U.C.A. § 35-1-77(2)(d) 
(1988) states: 
The commission may base its findings and 
decisions on the report of the panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants, but is not 
bound by the report if other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding. 
In Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Wallace. 728 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1988) 
the Supreme Court of Utah found that the Commission can reject 
the finding of the medical panel and rely on other evidence in 
the record. Also, in Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 
657 P.2d 1367, 1371-1372 (1983), the Supreme Court of Utah upheld 
the Commission's finding regarding medical causation despite the 
fact that the medical panel made contrary findings. The 
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Pittsburg Testing Court relied on other medical evidence and 
rejected the medical panel report. Id. 
If an ALJ determines that there is no evidence of 
medical causation and that it is unnecessary to refer a case to a 
medical panel, then it would be illogical to require her to do so 
in light of the fact that she could rely on other medical 
evidence and disregard the findings of the medical panel. It 
would also be a costly waste of State resources to require 
reference of every single matter to a medical panel when the ALJ 
is able to make a determination without the assistance of a 
panel. Petitioner essentially argues for mandating referral to a 
panel every time a petitioner loses on medical causation. This 
is contrary to the 1982 amendment to U.C.A. § 35-1-77, and to the 
spirit of the case law, Champion Home Builders, 703 P.2d at 308, 
and should not be permitted. The Commission did not abuse its 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Beaver Creek respectfully 
requests that this Court deny Petitioner's Petition for Review. 
The February 18, 1992 order of the Industrial Commission should 
be affirmed because substantial evidence shows that Petitioner's 
disability is due to a preexisting condition and is not related 
to his April 15, 1988 work activities. The ALJ reviewed the 
medical records, heard Petitioner's testimony and made a factual 
determination as to the events that occurred and the lack of 
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proof of medical causation. The Industrial Commission's order 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this J 
y* 
day of January, 1993. 
RAY, QUINNEY, & NEBEKER 
Steven J. -Aeschbacher 
Attorneys for Beaver Creek 
Coal Co. and Cigna Insurance 
Co. 
6163.01/gsa 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A: Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-77 and 63-
46(b)-16 
Utah Administrative Code R490-1-9 
Exhibit B: Summary Medical Record Form - Dr. Lynn M. Gaufin 
Exhibit C: Summary Medical Record Form - Dr. David R. Heiner 
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R490-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical 
Panel. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commis-
sion adopts the following guidelines in determining 
the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must 
be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physi-
cal impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the tempo-
rary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, 
and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may 
be scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical 
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel 
report. Where there is a proffer of new written con-
flicting medical evidence, the Administrative Law 
Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the new 
evidence to the panel for consideration and clarifica-
tion. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize 
an injured worker to be examined by another physi-
cian for the purpose of obtaining a further medical 
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical 
issues involved, and to obtain a report addressing 
these medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to 
give an impairment rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be 
non-industrial, and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such 
further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medi-
cal panel or medical consultant and of their appear-
ance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for further 
medical examination or evaluation, as directed by the 
Administrative Law Judge, shall be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
Exhibit "A 
35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or 
medical consultants — Discretionary 
authority of commission to refer case 
— Findings and reports — Objections 
to report — Hearing — Expenses. 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation 
for injury by accident, or for death, arising out of 
or in the course of employment, and if the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier denies liability, 
the commission may refer the medical aspects of 
the case to a medical panel appointed by the com-
mission. The panel shall have the qualifications 
generally applicable to the medical panel under 
Section 35-2-56. 
(b) As an alternative method of obtaining an 
impartial medical evaluation of the medical as-
pects of a controverted case, the commission in 
its sole discretion may employ a medical director 
or medical consultants on a full-time or part-time 
basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical 
evidence and advising the commission with re-
spect to its ultimate fact-finding responsibility. If 
all parties agree to the use of a medical director 
or medical consultants, they shall be allowed to 
function in the same manner and under the same 
procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or 
medical consultants shall make such study, take 
such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the 
commission, as it may determine to be necessary 
or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or 
medical consultants shall make a report in writ-
ing to the commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional find-
ings as the commission may require. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute 
full copies of the report to the applicant, the em-
ployer, and its insurance carrier by registered 
mail with return receipt requested. Within 15 
days after the report is deposited in the United 
States post office, the applicant, the employer, or 
its insurance carrier may file with the commis-
sion written objections to the report. If no written 
objections are filed within that period, the report 
is considered admitted in evidence. 
(d) The commission may base its finding and 
decision on the report of the panel, medical direc-
tor, or medical consultants, but is not bound by 
the report if other substantial conflicting evi-
dence in the case supports a contrary finding. 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the com-
, mission may set the case for hearing to deter-
mine the facts and issues involved. At the hear-
ing, any party so desiring may request the com-
mission to have the chairman of the medical 
panel, the medical director, or the medical con-
sultants present at the hearing for examination 
and cross-examination. For good cause shown, 
the commission may order other members of the 
panel, with or without the chairman or the medi-
cal director or medical consultants, to be present 
at the hearing for examination and cross-exami-
nation. 
(0 The written report of the panel, medical di-
rector, or medical consultants may be received as 
an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be consid-
ered as evidence in the case except as far as it is 
sustained by the testimony admitted. 
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the 
medical panel, medical director, or medical con-
sultants and the expenses of their appearance be-
fore the commission shall be paid out of the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund. isss 
E x h i b i t "A 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency lias acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious, lass 
Exh ib i t "A 
3 5 0 S O U T H 4 0 0 C A S T — S U I T E 2 0 2 
v m o m . u a O^BNCY S^i-x L*«« CITT. UT*H 64111 " ^ T C M I M ? " 
BARBARA A OABNCY 
SUMMARY OF MEDICAL RECORD 
REGARDING AN INDUSTRIAL INJURY 
ID: Dr. Lynn Gaufin Applicant Kerry LeRoy Willardson 
1055 North 300 West, Suite 400~ Date of Injury 04/15/88 
Provo, Utah 84604 Area Affected Right Hip & Leo 
1. Is there a medically demonstrated causal relationship between the indus-
trial injury and the problems you have been treating? Lj&p 
2. Has Applicant reached maxim mi medical improvement? tb? When? £/5~/(tS 
3. Has Applicant,been released by you to return to work? When?c£^f££22^^ 
4. Was it a regular full duty or light duty work release? /Jo 
5. Has Applicant a permanent impairment due to the industrial injury? <^> ; 
if so, what is the percent of impairment (vfcole body)? J&S£~ *~V?'/2.*Zt 
6. Has Applicant a permanent impalrnimfc which existed before his industrial 
injury? Uao $ if so, \toat is the percent of impairment (\*ole body)? 2J?k *%> * Uj 
thg^m „ _ _ . . .
 w-
was any pre-existing oandition aggravated by the industrial injury? /3uu* OALAL, 
T^ 4-~3 *.V*~ ->^ fey £f -J 23 , 
7. Was g'xhdustxial injury aggravated by any pre-existing oandition and,/ar 
my pre-existing oandition aggravated by the in 
Dated this "" day of ^ 19 
^li^idiarjJjS^Signature 
ADTK3RIZATION FOR RET EASE OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 
I hereby authorize and request you to release to my attorneys, DAENEY & DAB-
NEY, P.C., the above requested medical information concerning my medical 
history, physical condition, prognoses and treatment rendered by you to me. 
IF 1HERE IS ANY CHARGE INVOLVED IN PROVIDING TOE REQUESTED INFORMATION, PLEASE 
FORWARD A BTTI, FOR SUCH SERVICE DlRbX.'1'LY TO ME (THE PATIENT). 
,ned Releaw m tfwy^ ^Patient's Signature 
questions to above law firm, not Utah Industrial Commission! 
000060 
initial 
V i n O l N I U S O A B N E Y 
B A R B A R A A D A B N C Y 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
3 S O S O U T H 4 0 0 C A S T — S U I T E 2 0 2 
S A L T L+KX CITT. UTAH 84111 AMCA COOC «Ol 
TO: 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
5-
6 . 
7 . 
SUMMARY OF MEDICAL RE03RD 
REGARDING AN INDUSTRIAL INJURY 
Dr. David R. Heiner 
945 Wpst Hospital Dr, f Suite 8 
P r i r p , Utah 845Q1 
Applicant 
Date of Injury 
Area Affected 
Kerry LeRoy Willardso 
04/15/00 
Right Nip & Leg 
Is there a medically demonstrated causal relationship between the indus-
tr ia l injury and the problems you have been treating? ^u^cy 
Has Applicant reached maximum medical iiiprovement? ^M£S When? 
Has Applicant been released by ycxi to return to woncT^a When? 
Was i t a regular full duty or light duty work release? 
Has Applicant a permanent impairment due to the industrial injury? 
i f so, vfoat i s the percent of impairment fabole bcdy) ? /<r°/+ 
Has Appli 
injury? 
a permanent iifpairmmt WbicH existed before his industrial 
; i f so, vfoat i s the percent of impairment ft&ole bodvli? JfS^X 
Was the industrial injury aggravated by airy pre-e>dsting condition 
vas any pre-existing condition aggravated by the jjrhistrial injury? 
Dated th i s I *f day of , QjU^/lyfin bpf, 19 <^T. /'> 
**tt 
Riysidi^n's Signature 
AIZIB3RIZATIOK TOR KETiTftSE OF MEDICAL IKFUEMAITCN 
I hereby authorize and request you to release to my attorneys, DABNEY & DAB-
NEY, P.C., the above requested medical information concerning my medical 
history, physical condition, prognoses and treatment rendered fcy ycu to me. 
IF THERE IS ANY CHARSE INVOLVED IN FR3VIDINS THE REQUESTED INK2RMA110N, PLEASE 
FORWARD A RTTL FOR SUCH SERVICE DIRECTLY TO ME (SHE PATIENT). 
' 03 J 
U ^t£^/aAr&2*^ 
My# <^ffi 
i t ient's Signature 
SWORN to before me this 1 ^ day of/QipUdUaJ^- , 23^5 . 
Notary-'7 P^slic 
O ' 
fcslic Residing in:. „ 
NPI^y ftfttoo^ ^ y questions to above law firm, not Ufaih Industrial Commission! 
000( 
'4 TE O' 
Exhibit "C" 
